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THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY'S 
INDEPENDENCE MYTH 
James E. Moliterno* 
INTRODUCTION 
Are administrative judges1 independent in the usual judicial 
independence sense? To the extent they are, of what are they 
independent? If they should be independent, what does 
independence mean in their unique context? In this Article, I will 
explore a question that has occupied some considerable attention 
among administrative judges and administrative law scholars.2 I 
am neither. Instead, I bring the perspective of legal and judicial 
* Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. 
Many thanks to my colleague, Charles Koch, for introducing me to the 
fascinating world of administrative judges and administrative law generally. 
He should not be blamed for my errors or lack of administrative law 
sophistication. Thanks as well for marvelous research assistance on this project 
to Donald Goodman and Margaret Shoup and, in general, to the Graduate 
Research Fellows program at William & Mary, which provides seemingly 
limitless, excellent research assistance. 
1. In this Article, I use the general term administrative judge or 
administrative judiciary to include administrative law judges, administrative 
judges, hearing officers, and others who might fairly be included in the so-called 
"administrative judiciary." The differences among members of this group have 
modest effects on parts of this Article, effects discussed in specific sections. In 
the main, the differences are not consequential for this Article. 
2. See, e.g., Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings: 
Establishing Independent Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While 
Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. 
L. JUDGES 119 (2005); James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State 
Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ 
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1382-85 
(2002); Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It 
Be Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863 (1995); Harold J. Krent & 
Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with 
Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. 
L. JUDGES 1 (2005); L. Hope O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, 
Performance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence 
Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 591 (1986). 
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ethics to the issue of administrative judge independence.3 
After a bit of background on role and rule in the analysis of 
ethics issues in Part I, Part II asks whether it is proper to call 
administrative judges "judges." Concluding that such a designation 
is accurate, Part III gives background on judicial independence and 
distinguishes independence from another judicial attribute, 
impartiality. Part IV takes this discussion of judicial independence 
and applies it to the role of administrative judge, concluding that 
administrative judges, though properly called judges, are not meant 
to be independent in the judicial sense. 
The lack of judicial independence of administrative judges is no 
mark of failure or embarrassment. On the contrary, the role of 
administrative judge, properly understood, is critically important to 
our justice delivery system, although it simultaneously does not 
implicate judicial independence. Administrative judges have an 
important role to fill: they are meant to preside impartially over fair 
hearings that implement and administer agency policy. To perform 
this critical role in the most effective way, administrative judges are 
not to function in a judicially independent way. Instead, they must 
recognize that their role demands adherence to agency policy and 
goals. Judges of the judicial branch, acting independently of the 
executive and legislative branches, will apply contested legal 
principles and rules to executive agency action, including that taken 
by the administrative judiciary. 
I. ETHICS, ROLE, AND INDEPENDENCE 
Ethics issues are all about role and context. Once past the 
simplistic "don't lie, cheat, or steal" rule, and past just staring at the 
text of the rules themselves in an entirely formalist way, everything 
in professional ethics is about role and context. Role and context 
determine the appropriate actions and attributes of legal 
professionals. To be sure, the profession has produced a formalized 
version of the lawyer's and judge's roles by adopting sets of ethics 
rules,4 the violation of which produces professional consequences. 
3. With the range of agencies, each with its distinct mission, structure, 
history, and regulations, there are few absolutes and little consistency in 
terminology in administrative law, and, therefore, in the life of the 
administrative judge. Terminology is difficult to manage because of varied· 
usages in varied agencies. Some statements that may seem in error to some 
readers may simply be a reflection of my focus on one agency structure or 
another that is inconsistent with the reader's knowledge base. Any real errors 
that remain in this piece are mine and do not belong to those from whom I have 
gained my modest level of administrative law knowledge. 
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003); MODEL CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT (2004). 
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But those rules are a starting point, rather than an ending point, for 
most serious analysis of lawyer and judge conduct. They play a 
part-but only a part-in lawyer regulation.5 They cover lawyers 
and judges in a general way, but mostly fail to account for 
differences in the practice settings, and say little at all about what 
makes a good lawyer or judge. To play a role well, whether it be in a 
play, in a sport, or in a professional milieu, knowing the rules of 
acting, of the game, or of the profession is far from fulfilling the role 
well. Understanding the role illuminates the rules' meaning.6 
Consider, generally, the attributes of the lawyer's role: a lawyer 
acts as a representative of a client (as a special sort of agent), 
pursuing that client's interests within prescribed boundaries, while 
maintaining an eye on the public interest. These simple attributes 
of the lawyer's role dictate the nature, scope, and interpretation of 
the lawyer ethics rules, confidentiality rules, conflicts rules, and so 
on. Yet, this general description belies the complexity of the wide 
variety of sub-roles that lawyers serve, depending on their 
particular practice setting. 
Prosecutors and other government lawyers have no individual 
client and, by role, must serve the public interest to an extent 
greater than other lawyers must, creating different confidentiality7 
and conflicts implications, all while facing the special burdens, joys, 
and challenges of being a public employee and a public official. 8 
Lawyers for corporations fill a slightly different role as well, 
representing an entity rather than a flesh and blood individual, and 
5. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 804-14 (1992). 
6. James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: 
Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83, 99 (1991) ("[L]earning to play the game well (learning to 
lawyer ethically) is accomplished not so much by learning the game's rules, 
though learn them the players must, as by the activity of playing (experience 
with lawyering behavior) .... A player might well learn the text and basic 
meaning of the rules by reading and discussing them; but to learn the subtleties 
that define what it means to play well, the player must experience the play 
itself."). 
7. James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government Lawyer's Duty to Breach 
Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 633, 633 (2005). 
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) (noting that a 
prosecutor has the responsibility for being not only an advocate, but also a 
minister of justice who carries the obligation of ensuring that defendants 
receive "procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence"); Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, 
and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 
790 (2000). 
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different ethics rules and interpretations apply to them as a resule 
In-house corporate lawyers have, as well, their lawyer role swirled 
with that of employee, creating further complications in the law that 
governs their conduct and its implications.1° Criminal defense 
lawyers, in recognition of their special role in representing the 
individual in jeopardy against the power of the state, face particular 
ethical challenges. And the list goes on and on from practice setting 
to practice setting. 11 
And then there is the judge's role and the range of ethics 
standards with which judges must comply. Judges who are also 
licensed to practice law must abide by the lawyer ethics rules that 
are not representation-related. The judge's role requires an entirely 
new lens for ethics analysis: forget (largely) about confidentiality; 
forget about client loyalty and those sorts of conflicts. Judges must 
focus on integrity, impartiality, independence, fairness, competence, 
and, because of the judge's closer connection with the system of 
justice and the public interest involved, appearance of impropriety 
as it relates to public confidence in the justice system. 
And then there are administrative judges. If we are not 
surprised that lawyer ethics principles change from practice setting 
to practice setting, we should not be surprised to find that the ethics 
attributes of the one kind of judge (an administrative judge) should 
differ from those of another kind of judge. Arguably, administrative 
judges have the most complex mixture of roles, and therefore of 
ethics guidelines, of any law professional. For those administrative 
judges who are lawyers, the lawyers' rules govern some aspects of 
their behavior.12 To some extent, the ethics rules for judges apply to 
administrative judges, though finding the appropriate, specific set of 
governing rules is not always straightforward. 13 As public officials, 
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2004) 
(requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to issue rules 
setting minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and 
practicing before the SEC); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-92 
(1981); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003). 
10. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 
(Cal. 1994); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ill. 1991); Mourad v. 
Auto. Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Crews v. 
Buckman Labs. Int'l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 858 (Tenn. 2002); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001). 
11. See James E. Moliterno, Practice Setting as an Organizing Theme for a 
Law and Ethics of Lawyering Curriculum, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 394 
(1998). 
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1·.4 (2003). 
13. See MODEL CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT (2004); MODEL CODE OF Jun. 
CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN. LAw JUDGES (1995); MODEL CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT 
FOR FED. ADMIN. LAW JUDGES (1989). 
2006] INDEPENDENCE MYTH 1195 
administrative judges must account for the public interest in 
somewhat the same way as does a prosecutor, a government lawyer, 
a commissioner of an agency, or a bureaucrat. 14 As a federal or 
state employee, administrative judges must comply with applicable 
ethics statutes regarding conflicts and regulations of their particular 
• 15 
agencies. 
Complicating this overlay of ethics rules is the reality of many 
administrative judges' particular agency roles. Often, one of the 
litigants before the administrative judge is the judge's employer. 
When the agency appears in the matter, one of the lawyers before 
the administrative judge is a co-worker, at least in some broad 
sense.
16 Often, the experts for one of the litigants are co-workers of 
the judge; often, the administrator of one of the litigants is in control 
of the judge's budget. What seems to pass for ethics determinations 
regarding some administrative17 decisions are really employment 
law issues18 that find a place in the Merit Systems Protection Board 
14. See 7 U.S.C. § 87 (2000) (prohibiting a person performing an official 
function under the grain standards chapter from being "financially interested 
... in any business entity owning or operating any grain elevator or warehouse 
or engaged in the merchandising of grain"); 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2000, Supp. III 
2005) (restricting, for a time, former officers, employees, and elected officials of 
the executive and legislative branches from communicating with an officer or 
employee of the United States or District of Columbia with the intent to 
influence that person on behalf of another in connection with described 
matters); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1090 (Deering 2002) (prohibiting public officials 
from being "financially interested in any contract made by them in their official 
capacity" or from being "purchasers at any sale or vendors at any pur;;hase 
made by them in their official capacity"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4304 (1997) ("No 
local governmental officer or employee shall, in the capacity of such an officer or 
employee, make or participate in the making of a contract with any person or 
business by which the officer or employee is employed or in whose business the 
officer or employee has a substantial interest."). 
15. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 164.40(a) (2005) (prohibiting Environmental 
Protection Agency administrative law judges from deciding "any matter in 
connection with a proceeding where he has a financial interest in any of the 
parties or a relationship with a party that would make it otherwise 
inappropriate for him to act"). 
16. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000) (prohibiting an employee from consulting a 
person or party on a fact in issue without giving all parties an opportunity to 
participate; prohibiting an employee from being subject to the supervision of an 
employee or agent performing investigative or prosecutorial functions for an 
agency; and prohibiting an employee engaged in the performance of 
investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency in that or a factually 
related case from participating or advising in the decision, recommended 
decision, or agency review, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings). 
17. See id. § 7703. 
18. See Yates v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 145 F.3d 1480, 1481 (1998). 
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review process. 
No other legal professional has this complex a mix-not private 
practice lawyers, not criminal defense lawyers, not prosecutors, not 
civil-side government lawyers, and not ordinary judges. 
The administrative judiciary presents a unique challenge for 
ethics study. Role is all that really matters at the bottom, and the 
role of the administrative judge is not merely complex in its generic 
form, but also varies further from agency to agency, taking into 
account the unique mission, history, and political setting of each 
agency. The differences between state and federal agencies alone 
makes generalization dangerous. And within state systems, which 
themselves vary, or within the federal system, the nuances and 
variances are myriad and significant. Studying the administrative 
judiciary requires studying the administrative state. I make no 
pretense of fully understanding the nuances present in the roles of 
the wide range of individuals who might fairly be called 
administrative judges. I will attempt to confine myself to common, 
generic attributes of most administrative judges, and I address in 
this Article one issue regarding the role of administrative judge: 
independence. 
Plainly, a major issue for administrative judges is the friction 
between independence and accountability. And given the unique 
setting of a judge who is employed by what is frequently one of the 
parties before the judge, that issue's prominence is unsurprising. If 
independence is truly a core attribute of the American style of 
judging, and if administrative judges are not independent, then 
administrative judges are more administrative functionaries with 
judge-like duties than they are judges. By contrast, if independence 
is not an essential attribute of judging, then perhaps non-
independent administrative judges are judges after all. 
In the end, the role question is always the same: what does the 
system within which this person functions expect of her? And for 
this inquiry, what does the system expect of administrative judges? 
Are they expert dispute resolvers within an agency, still carrying 
out the mission of the agency? What is the implication of the role 
question for administrative judges? 
II. ARE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES "JUDGES"? 
Administrative judges are judges in a fairly narrow, specific 
sense. They possess, of course, the fundamental core of the judicial 
definition, which, while nowhere given authoritatively, is by wide 
19. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (providing that "good cause" is required for discipline). 
There have been only twenty-four reported cases since 1946; see infra note 150 
and accompanying text. 
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approval known to consist in the impartial adjudication of cases. A 
judge is "[a] public official appointed or elected to hear and decide 
legal matters in court."20 The American Bar Association's Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct does not define ''judge" in its terminology 
section; it does, however, state that "[t]he judge is an arbiter of facts 
and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of 
government under the rule of law."21 Administrative judges are 
certainly both, and, in a most important and fundamental sense, 
they can certainly be called "judges." The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged as much: 
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern 
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within 
this framework is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge. 
His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a 
trial judge .... More importantly, the process of agency 
adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the 
hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the 
evidence before him, 22 free from pressures by the parties or 
other officials within the agency.23 
These protections on impartial decisionmaking are so 
important, in fact, that, like other judges, administrative judges are 
granted an absolute immunity from suit for actions committed in 
the performance of their duties.24 Administrative judges are true 
judges on this basis because they are impartial decisionmakers who 
adjudicate disputes between parties. 
All judges share this common characteristic. Even in legal 
systems that follow a different model, such as the civil law, judges 
are meant to be impartial adjudicators of disputes. One of the 
unique characteristics of the civil law, for example, is "the 
responsibility it places on the judge in dispute resolution."25 Civil 
law countries commonly do not use juries on the belief that the law 
is "too technical and refined to be properly understood by laymen"26 
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 844 (7th ed. 1999). 
21. MODEL CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT pmbl. (2004). 
22. Interestingly, the Court uses the word "independent" here. The context 
reveals that the Court is referring to independent fact finding, an activity more 
associated with the judicial attribute of impartiality rather than the traditional 
notions of judicial independence. See infra Part III. 
23. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). 
24. Id. at 514. 
25. Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design 
as the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 
139 (2004). 
26. Konstantinos D. Kerameus, A Civilian Lawyer Looks at Common Law 
Procedure, 47 LA. L. REV. 493, 502 (1987). 
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and that trial by jury suffers from "the cost of insensibility to 
general legal precepts and to predictability of result."27 It is, 
therefore, entirely the judge's responsibility to determine both facts 
and law. Administrative judges find facts and determine the law to 
be applied to those facts, though they do not make new law.28 In this 
sense, an administrative judge is very much like a civil law judge, 
but again, very much a judge. 
Indeed, administrative judges in the Social Security 
Administration ("SSA") are like civilian judges in more than their 
sole responsibility for adjudication. A SSA proceeding "is a system 
bearing little resemblance to the traditions of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence."29 Specifically, the inquisitorial system that prevails 
in the civilian tradition is also commonly used in SSA hearings. In 
the inquisitorial system, the judge plays an active role in both the 
fact-gathering and the fact-finding processes.30 In many forms of 
administrative hearings, the govemment is not present, and 
although the plaintiff (claimant, really) presents his claim, the 
administrative judge calls witnesses, collects evidence, and ensures 
that the record is fully developed.31 All of this establishes that 
administrative judges, while more active in the adjudicatory process 
than their Article III counterparts, are certainly judges in the broad 
sense--even if they often resemble their civil law, more than their 
common law, counterparts. In the end, they are impartial 
adjudicators of disputes. 
Administrative judges are also like civil law judges, and unlike 
common law judges, in that they are not formally bound by their 
own precedent. The fact that "the doctrine of stare decisis generally 
is not ... fully or strictly applicable to administrative decisions"32 is 
well understood by administrative law scholars and courts. 33 Since 
27. Id. at 503. 
28. See infra Part IV. 
29. Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal 
Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the 
Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 295 (1997). 
30. Id. at 303. 
31. Id. at 310; see also Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair 
Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving 
Social Security Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 31 (2003). 
32. E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Comment Note: Applicability of Stare 
Decisis Doctrine to Decisions of Administrative Agencies, 79 A.L.R.2d 1126, 
1131-32 (1961). 
33. See, e.g., B&J Oil & Gas v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 353 F.3d 
71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[W]e observed-unremarkably-that agencies may 
change their policies as long as they engage in reasoned decisionmaking and 
explain their breaks with precedent."); State Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics 
Bd., 174 F.2d 510, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 572 
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the doctrine of stare decisis "has for its object the salutary effect of 
uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law,"34 it contributes to 
impartial decisionmaking by preventing judges from deciding cases 
simply as they will. Instead, they must follow precedent. The 
comparable limiting principle for civil law judges is the Code. 
Administrative judges, not bound by their own precedent, are guided 
and constrained in their determinations by the state of the law 
external to their own decisions: statutes, court precedent, and 
administrative regulations. 35 
Although administrative judges are not required to follow 
precedent, they are required to make their decisions impartially 
based on factors outside of their own senses of proper agency policy. 
Clearly, administrative judges must follow the agency's legislative 
rules, but, perhaps more controversially with some administrative 
judges, they must also follow other statements or indicators of 
agency policy.36 They are, after all, agents of the agency and have no 
independent authority to divine policy. The only true source of their 
authority is the agency itself, and their judgment must be informed 
by the agency's and not their own sense of good policy. This aspect 
is an important distinction between administrative judges and 
Article III judges and their state court counterparts. 
In reality, if not required, administrative judges generally 
follow precedents in the same way as Article III courts,37 further 
cementing their status as impartial decisionmakers, and therefore 
eminently worthy of the name, "judge." However, the fact remains 
that Article III judges are able to make law by the doctrine of stare 
decisis, whereas administrative judges are entirely incapable of 
making law which is actually, rather than merely customarily, 
binding upon their fellows, or even upon their inferiors. In this way, 
then, administrative judges are judges in that they are impartial 
decisionmakers, but of a very different kind than are Article III 
judges or common law judges generally. 
III. IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
Like most carefully defined concepts, judicial independence 
(1950) ("[A]dministrative agencies are free from the application of the judicial 
doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata .... "). 
34. Schopler, supra note 32, at 1128. 
35. As a practical matter, requiring administrative judges in many 
settings-SSA determinations, for example-to follow precedent would be 
virtually impossible to manage given the multitude of judges and decisions. 
36. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (2005). 
37. Schopler, supra note 32, at 1132 ("[A]dministrative agencies ... act 
very much like courts, as regards precedents."). 
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exists as a matter of degree. In the narrow (and probably more 
precise) sense, independence is about insulating a judge's 
decisionmaking from interference from either the electorate, the 
legislative branch, or the executive branch. Thought of this way, 
some judges are more independent than others. Impartiality as a 
judicial trait is often confused with independence. Impartiality is 
about fair-minded, neutral decisionmaking. Independence is created 
primarily by structural aspects of government. Impartiality is 
created primarily by the structure of the dispute resolution process. 
All judges are in systems that foster impartiality; some judges are in 
structures that foster independence. Is independence a 
fundamental attribute of a judge? What is independence in the 
judicial sense?38 
Another way of seeing the relationship is to say that 
independence is a subset of impartiality, isolating only those 
influences that come from the electorate, the political process, or the 
other branches of government. The independence subset is not 
necessary to the role of judge, but is a desirable attribute if the 
judge is meant to check the other branches. 
One major process attribute designed to foster impartiality is 
38. See, e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 78-
81 (1941); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw & PRACTICE (2d ed. 1997); 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE§ 9.10 (4th ed. 2002); Stephen 
B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
323, 338-39 (2003); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic 
Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 80 
(1998); Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to 
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 370 (2002); John A. 
Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (2002); Walter 
Gellhorn, The Improvement of Public Administration, 2 NAT'L LAW. GUILD Q. 20, 
23 (1940); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and 
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 
IND. L.J. 153, 164-65 (2003); Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of 
American Judicial Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1012 (2002); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
535, 536 (1999); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 671, 688 (1980) [hereinafter Kaufman, Essence of Judicial 
Independence); Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE 
L.J. 681, 683-84 (1979) [hereinafter Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence); 
Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 458-64, 467 
(1986); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (1996); 
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 632 (1999); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal 
Profession and the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1119, 1125 (1997). 
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the prohibition on ex parte communications. Ex parte 
communications are communications with either party to a case 
concerning the case in the absence of the other parties; they are 
forbidden by the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct39 and are not permitted under the Administrative 
Procedure Act ("APA") in formal adjudications.40 The basic concept 
of a fair hearing entails contemporaneous opportunities to be heard 
in response to an opposing party's factual and legal assertions. Ex 
parte communications undermine that concept by allowing one 
party access to the decisionmaker in the absence of others. A judge 
so exposed to the unchecked arguments of one party experiences a 
threat to the judge's impartiality, not independence. 
Dispute resolution structures other than the ex parte 
prohibition foster impartiality by removing the judge's personal 
interests from the equation. The classic impartiality case41 
illustrates: During the prohibition era, the General Code of Ohio 
gave mayors, among others, authority to try without a jury cases of 
persons charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor in 
violation of the state's Prohibition Act.42 Defendant Tumey was 
tried and convicted before the mayor of the Village of North College 
Hill, Ohio, for such a violation.43 Tumey appealed his conviction as a 
violation of the due process guaranteed him under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.44 Fines collected upon conviction 
under the statute were divided between the state and the village.45 
Under a local village ordinance, deputy marshals, detectives, 
prosecuting attorneys, and the mayor were compensated from the 
village's portion of the fines above their normal salaries for their 
parts in securing a conviction.46 Since no fees or costs in such cases 
were paid to the mayor, except by the defendant if convicted, there 
was no way by which the mayor would be paid for his service as 
judge if he did not convict those who were brought before him.47 The 
Supreme Court held: 
39. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3, § B(7) (2004). 
40. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000). The ex parte and separation of functions 
prohibitions together insulate administrative judges from party influence in 
formal adjudications. The restrictions themselves are described in 5 U.S.C. § 
557. Through 5 U.S.C. § 556, these restrictions apply in the instances offormal 
hearing as described in 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
41. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
42. ld. at 516-17. 
43. ld. at 516. 
44. ld. at 514-15. 
45. ld. at 517. 
46. Id. at 518-19. 
4 7. !d. at 520. 
1202 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
[l]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, 
to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the 
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary 
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.48 
Additionally, the mayor was "the chief executive of the village," and 
thus responsible for the finances of the village.49 The statute offered 
the village officers "a means of substantially adding to the income of 
the village to relieve it from further taxation.',so The Court 
summarized, "A situation in which an official perforce occupies two 
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the 
other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the 
trial of defendants charged with crimes before him.''51 
By contrast to the ever-necessary judicial attribute of 
impartiality, some judges are meant to be more independent than 
others, without diminishing the sense in which the less independent 
judge is a judge. Even the most independent U.S. judges, Article Ill 
judges, are not completell2 and literally independent:53 
"Independence" literally means the absence of 
dependence, which is to say complete autonomy and 
insusceptibility to external guidance, influence, or control. If 
48. ld. at 523. 
49. Id. at 533. 
50. ld. 
51. Id. at 534. 
52. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 38, at 326-27 (recognizing that a 
completely independent judiciary would not create an orderly society); Terri 
Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding 
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 349 (2003) ("Evidence abounds 
that American judges possess only a modest amount of independence."). 
53. For example, the judiciary was threatened with impeachment and 
restrictions on their judicial independence following the case of a Florida 
woman, Terri Schiavo. Schiavo lapsed into a permanent vegetative state after 
heart failure deprived her brain of oxygen for an extended period. See Carl 
Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al. For fifteen years, a feeding tube 
provided artificial nutrition and hydration to keep her body alive. See id. In 
early 2005, federal courts refused to get involved after lower courts ordered 
doctors to remove Schiavo's feeding tube. See id. Then House Majority Leader 
Tom DeLay suggested impeachment for those federal judges who did not 
intervene in Schiavo's case, warning they would be responsible for their 
behavior. See id. DeLay stepped back from those warnings somewhat, but still 
instructed the House Judiciary Committee to examine the actions of federal 
judges in the Schiavo case and to recommend possible legislation. See David 
Sommer, Schiavo Autopsy, TAMPA TRIB., June 16, 2005, at 1; Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Majority Leader Asks House Panel to Review Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
14, 2005, at Al. 
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we think of judicial independence in literal terms, however, 
federal judges are not "independent," at least not as 
dictionaries define the word. They are not autonomous, 
because Congress retains ultimate control over their budget, 
jurisdiction, structure, size, administration, and rulemaking. 
Moreover, they are susceptible to outside influence; if judges 
engage in behavior (on or off the bench) that the political 
branches characterize as criminal, they may be prosecuted and 
imprisoned; if they make politically unacceptable decisions, 
the President and Senate may decline to appoint them to 
higher judicial office; if they commit ''high crimes and 
misdemeanors," they may be impeached and removed from 
office; if they make decisions with which higher courts 
disagree, their decisions may be reversed; and if they engage 
in behavior that judicial councils regard as misconduct, they 
may be disciplined. 54 
1203 
In turn, "[f]ederal judges are thereby rendered autonomous in 
the limited sense that they have an enforceable monopoly over 'the 
judicial power,' and are insulated from two discrete forms of 
influence or control, namely, threats to their tenure and salary."55 
That is what makes Article III judges independent. Why are they 
not completely independent? Because "[i]ncreased judicial 
independence is not always better.',s6 Judicial independence is not 
an end in itself; it is a means to an end,57 and it ought to be curtailed 
when it ceases to be conducive to that end. 
What, then, is the purpose of Article III judicial independence? 
What end is served? While independence, in part, enhances 
impartiality, that enhancement is far from the primary purpose of 
independence. Most fundamentally, independence "preserve[s] the 
integrity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government.''58 We 
54. Geyh, supra note 38, at 159 (footnotes omitted). 
55. Id. 
56. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 195 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
57. Burbank, supra note 38, at 324; see Geyh, supra note 38, at 163 n.29 
("[J]udicial independence is not an end in itself, but an instrumental value that 
serves another end."). 
58. Id. at 162; see also Cross, supra note 56, at 195 (defining judicial 
independence as "freedom from control . . . by the other political branches of 
government"); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 38, at 962 (noting that the end of 
independence and accountability is "a well-functioning system of adjudication"); 
Kaufman, Essence of Judicial Independence, supra note 38, at 691 (observing 
that the Supreme Court's definition of judicial independence has stated that its 
purpose is keeping the judiciary "free from undue interference by the President 
or Congress"); Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, supra note 38, at 713 
(arguing that judicial independence should not only protect the independence of 
the judicial branch, but also the independence of the individual judges); 
Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and 
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want individual judges to decide cases without being influenced by 
anything other than the facts and the law. We also want the 
judiciary to function as a third branch of government and check the 
other two. At the same time, however, we do not want the judiciary 
to be able to run amok, doing whatever it wants. So we guarantee 
judicial tenure and salary, but we do not guarantee that the entire 
judiciary will be free from any checks from the other branches. We 
see, then, elements of both independence and accountabilitl9 in the 
formulation of our federal judiciary. But to make the judicial checks 
on the other branches meaningful, the Article III balance is 
decidedly tilted toward independence and away from accountability. 
These accountability checks on the courts are almost never 
used, even though they are technically available to Congress,60 
perhaps because Congress does not want to interfere with judicial 
independence, or perhaps for fear of partisan tit for tat. There is, 
therefore, a definite "tension"61 between independence and 
accountability.62 How can we resolve this tension, keeping judges 
accountable to the other branches while not beholden to them? 
Geyh distinguished among three types of independence in order 
to help explain how the Constitution, and the way we have 
interpreted it, does so. There is "doctrinal" independence (simply 
the independence which Article III makes indisputable), "functional" 
independence (that independence which is at the sufferance of 
Congress), and "customary" independence (the independence 
granted by the customs of interfering or not interfering in 
constitutionally permitted ways with judicial independence). 63 
The political branches struck a constitutional balance over time 
Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 65 (2001) (explaining that judicial 
independence enables courts to "serve as an institutional check on the 
legislative and executive branches and that judicial independence is essential 
for the judiciary to protect the rule oflaw") (footnotes omitted). 
59. The desirable degree of accountability, of course, depends upon our 
theory of judicial decision making. See Larkin, supra note 58, at 66 (recognizing 
that the importance of judicial accountability over and against judicial 
independence depends on "what political and social role a judge should play"). 
The debate over judicial activism is crucial on this point; here, however, it is not 
at issue. 
60. See Geyh, supra note 38, at 163-64. 
61. Larkin, supra note 58, at 65. 
62. Burbank has argued that this is not really a conflict, but simply 
another side to the judicial coin. However, his own phraseology establishes that 
the two balance one another, and so the distinction is most likely solely 
rhetorical; Burbank merely means to say that the tension between 
independence and accountability is not a conflict, but a balancing. See 
Burbank, supra note 38, at 330-32. 
63. Geyh, supra note 38, at 164-65. 
2006] INDEPENDENCE MYTH 1205 
between judicial accountability and independence.64 This balance, 
which is represented by customary independence, can be altered by 
the political branches.65 Similarly, the courts may alter the scope of 
doctrinal independence.66 Though doctrinal independence and 
customary independence are bound to constitutional norms, 
functional independence is "shaped by the vagaries of any given 
day's public policy."67 This customary independence is not, of course, 
inviolable. However, methods of constraining the judiciary which 
have traditionally been considered antithetical to judicial 
independence are presumptively unconstitutional according to this 
scheme.68 Essentially, Geyh argued that Congress has refrained 
from interfering with this "customary independence" because it has 
so interpreted the Constitution as to make such interference 
unconstitutional.69 Congress is, by so doing, exercising self-
restraint,70 just as courts occasionally do. 
Article III judges, at least when thought of as members of courts 
made up of several judges (the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal, 
and the district court panels), are themselves the products of a 
combination of executive and legislative choice.71 The selection and 
confirmation process is a real but modest detraction from judicial 
independence. Although each individual Article III judge may be 
almost entirely insulated from legislative and executive oversight 
once confirmed (there remains only the impeachment threat), even 
they are less than perfectly independent. They remain as members 
of courts the composition of which will be influenced by future 
appointments. 72 Even seeming lone-ranger district court judges 
have changing panels of future appellate courts to which they look 
64. Id. at 165. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 165-66. 
69. Id. at 166. 
70. Id. at 165. 
71. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 141 (2000) (discussing the 1999 
choreographed exchange between President Clinton and Senator Orrin Hatch, 
in which Senator Hatch agreed to move pending judicial nominations through 
the confirmation process as long as the President kept Senator Hatch's 
preferred candidate moving through the nomination process). 
72. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal 
Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided 
Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 686 (2000); Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, 
Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 
VA. L. REV. 805, 806, 808 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717,1719 (1997). 
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forward. Nonetheless, Article III judges possess the greatest 
measure of independence of any American judges. 
Where does this leave accountability, however, if Congress has 
progressively abandoned the constitutionally permitted methods of 
curbing the courts? Perhaps it lies entirely in the appointment 
process. 73 The appointment process is the only constitutional 
restraint on the judiciary that Congress has shown itself willing to 
exercise; every other method (adjusting court size, reducing court 
budgets, impeachment for unfavorable decisions) has been gradually 
abandoned, forming the "customary" independence of Article III 
courts. 74 The appointment process stands as the only remaining 
check on Article III independence, ensuring the judiciary's integrity 
as a third branch of government so that it can serve as a check on 
the two others and its own accountability. 75 
Many state court judges have a high degree of independence 
from the legislative and executive branches, but less than that of 
Article III judges. State judges lack life tenure and perfect 
protection against compensation reduction. State court judicial 
selection and renewal processes result in structures less friendly to 
independence than those of Article III judges. Elected state judges 
have significant independence from the legislative and executive 
branches, but must answer to the electorate and have a lower 
measure of independence from the people as a result. To be sure, in 
many states, terms are long,76 and reelection processes so 
substantially favor incumbents that this reduction from life tenure 
may, in practice, be modest. But it exists to some measure in all 
instances. Given the new freedom to campaign in judicial 
elections, 77 independence from the electorate is likely to diminish 
73. Geyh, supra note 38, at 220 ("(I]f Congress is to reclaim ground lost to 
the Supreme Court ... it will be via the appointments process."). 
74. Id. at 211 (noting that Congress restrains itself against limiting the 
court except in the appointments process). 
75. Whether or not reducing congressional control of the judiciary entirely 
to the appointment process does, in fact, maintain judicial accountability is not 
at issue here; we are only concerned with the principles behind the facts, not 
the facts themselves. 
76. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional 
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 630 (1981); Donald A. Dripps, 
Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of 
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1435 (2003); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and 
Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1993). 
Information on state judicial term limits is found in 37 COUNCIL OF STATE 
Gov'TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 318-21 tbl.5.6 (2005). Examples of long terms for 
state judges include fourteen-year initial terms for trial-level judges in New 
York, twelve-year terms in Delaware, and ten-year terms in Pennsylvania. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) 
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further for elected judges. 
Appointed state judges begin with some form of the same input 
from the other branches as Article III judges, but their renewal 
processes substantially decrease their independence. These judges 
periodically must stand for reappointment by either the executive or 
the legislative branch and risk termination when they act in ways 
that displease the branch that considers their renewal.78 While 
appointed judges are less beholden to the electorate than elected 
judges, they remain just a step removed: the branch that renews 
judges is itself subject to the winds of electoral change. 
There are two sets of system attributes that support 
independence. One set is structural: federal judges are selected 
through a process that involves both of the other branches; they 
have life tenure; and their salary cannot be reduced. State judges 
live in a system that is less structurally friendly to independence: 
many are elected; some are selected by legislatures; most are closer 
to the political process for one reason or another; and their court 
budgets are subject to local political contests. When these structural 
(holding that a Minnesota law prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing 
their views on legal and political issues violates the First Amendment); Weaver 
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding First 
Amendment protection of campaign-related speech made by judicial 
candidates). 
78. In Virginia, judges of state courts of record are elected by a majority 
vote of each house of the General Assembly ("GA"). VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
Candidates must go through steps, however, before they are voted on by the 
GA. First, candidates interview with a panel of citizens and lawyers. Katrice 
Hardy, GOP Leaders Hope to Change How Judges are Reappointed, ROANOKE 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at B3. Then, the candidate seeks support "from [her] bar 
associations and must win nominations from [her] Senate and House 
representatives." Id. The leading candidates then interview with the Senate 
and House Courts of Justice committees. ld. Mter the committees make their 
top selections, the Senate and House vote on the judgeships. ld. Virginia's 
system of judicial appointment has received criticism, as shown in the case of 
Verbena Askew, a Newport News Circuit Judge denied a second term in 2003. 
See Robert McCabe, Lawmakers Deny 2nd Term to Judge; Racism Charged in 
Controversial Decision on Newport News Jurist, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 23, 2003, 
at Al. Due to lawyers' complaints about Askew's demeanor and work habits on 
the bench and due to Askew's failure to disclose during the judicial review 
process a complaint filed by a former city employee alleging sexual harassment 
and retaliation by Askew, the Senate and House Courts of Justice committees 
found Askew was not qualified for reappointment. ld. The decision not to 
reappoint Askew resulted in allegations of discrimination based on race and 
sexual orientation, as well as allegations that the decision was politically 
motivated. Id. More recently, legislators have been working to improve the 
judicial appointment process, including proposing a reform that would require 
independent performance evaluations of judges up for reappointment. See 
Hardy, supra, at B3. 
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attributes are present, as they are in the federal judicial system, 
they tend to foster independence from interference by the other 
branches. 
The other set is largely relational, rather than structural: 
judges are insulated from most ex parte communication; they are 
not to be the recipient of extravagant gifts; and they must monitor 
their outside interests. These rules are largely meant to foster 
judicial independence from inappropriate influence by the parties to 
litigation or others interested in the outcome of litigation. This set 
of attributes might more accurately be said to foster impartiality as 
much as they foster independence. 
In some sense, independence is a personal trait.79 Structures 
can foster it or not. On some level, however, judges are, or are not, 
independent because of their personal qualities. State judges might 
act independently of political influence from the other branches and 
of the electorate, even though structures do not lend support to such 
conduct. Such judges run the risk of being ex-judges, and when that 
occurs, the structures have won. In any event, even judges of 
independent spirit and inclination are not independent in the 
judicial sense when their decisions are subject to direct, de novo 
review by the agency. 
Independence is not an essential attribute of judging. While 
many state court judges may function with high levels of 
independence, structures to foster high levels of independence are 
not in place in most states. One can only conclude that state 
government founders did not regard judicial independence with the 
same regard as did federal government founders. Independence, at 
least the structural independence from interference from the other 
branches, is most important when the judiciary is expected to 
function in a counter-majoritarian manner.80 
79. Edwin Felter distinguishes between "functional" and "practical" 
independence. He says functional independence is the personal trait of being 
independent, despite structures that disfavor independence. Practical 
independence refers to the institutional structures that foster independence. 
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 413 (2001); see also Ann Marshall Young, Judicial 
Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Past, Present, and Future, 
JUDGES' J., Summer 1999, at 16, 42 (defining "functional decisional 
independence" and "practical decisional independence"). 
80. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1457, 1491-94 (2005) ("[Though] there is indeed increasing evidence that many 
elections for state supreme courts are hotly contested, costly, and highly 
politicized affairs .... [I]t is not unfair to call these exceptions to the rule oflow-
profile [state] judicial campaigns. The majoritarian pressures of the exceptions 
are indeed troubling, but they do not support a conclusion that state judges, at 
any level, are systematically forfeiting federal constitutional rights due to a fear 
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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE INDEPENDENCE 
Many reliable and prominent administrative law scholars,81 
courts,82 and administrative judges83 use the word "independence" to 
describe administrative judges, and seem to assume that 
administrative judges are expected to share this attribute with 
judicial branch decisionmakers. In fact, administrative judges are 
meant to make impartial decisions, but not to be independent. 
These two judicial concepts are easily conflated and confused with 
one another. 84 
In the broader sense of "judge" in the federal system, however, 
administrative judges cannot be so called. In the first place, not 
even the most zealous administrative judge would deny that "[t]he 
ALJ ... has not been invested with judicial authority independent of 
the agency head."85 This is a vital difference which forever puts to 
rest the idea that administrative judges are judges just as Article III 
judges are. Furthermore, Article III judges are given a power 
beyond the simple adjudication of disputes. Justice Antonin Scalia 
notes this difference in his article on administrative judges, 
observing that the Article III judge has the "authority to overrule 
the actions of the two elected branches,',s6 but that "[n]o such power 
inheres in the presiding officers at administrative hearings, even if 
Congress chooses to call them judges."87 
The Supreme Court has weighed in similarly in this regard, 
declaring that, while administrative judges cannot be compared to 
the Article III judiciary, they are nevertheless a true judiciary. In 
addition to their affirmation of administrative judge judicial status 
in Butz v. Economou,88 the Court's position is further specified in 
of the electorate.") (footnotes omitted). 
81. KocH, supra note 38, § 5.24; PIERCE, supra note 38. 
82. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) ("[T]he process of agency 
adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner 
exercises his independent judgment .... "); Stephens v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
986 F.2d 493, 494-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
83. See Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial 
Independence and Accountability in Administrative Law, JUDGES' J., Winter 
1997, at 22, 22; Young, supra note 79, at 42. 
84. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 1014 (discussing judicial independence 
and factors that affect judicial decisionmaking). 
85. Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing 
Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 475, 515 (2001). 
86. Antonio Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-a Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 61 
(1979). 
87. Id. at 61-62. 
88. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
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Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference.89 While 
occasionally referring to administrative judges as "quasi-judicial 
officers,"90 implying that they are not truly judges, the Court 
unambiguously affirmed the status of administrative judges as 
members of a true judiciary. The Court stated that "Congress 
intended to make hearing examiners 'a special class of semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers."'91 
The Court was clear that administrative judges are 
fundamentally different from Article III judges. It even enumerated 
the differences precisely: 
The position of hearing examiners is not a constitutionally 
protected position. It is a creature of congressional enactment. 
The respondents have no vested right to positions as 
examiners. They hold their posts by such tenure as Congress 
sees fit to give them. Their positions may be regulated 
completely by Congress, or Congress may delegate the exercise 
of its regulatory power, under proper standards, to the Civil 
Service Commission, which it has done in this case.92 
Administrative judges are not federal judges; they are a 
special kind of judge, which is only "semi-independent," and 
which is substantially different from the type of judge envisioned 
by Article III. What are the causes of these differences? To 
answer this question we must first examine the question of 
judicial independence generally. What do we mean by saying 
that federal judges are independent, and that administrative 
judges are "semi-independent"? Their version of independence 
should be thought of with this qualification in mind. 
There is no need for the defensiveness exhibited in a variety of 
administrative judge-written pieces on independence.93 The fact 
that administrative judges may not be meant to be independent in 
the judicial, especially Article III, sense, does not mean that 
administrative judges are not professionals and are not playing a 
critical role in the delivery of justice and the application of law. 
Their role in delivering justice to individuals is critical. But critical 
roles can be played without independence. Administrative judges 
need not share every attribute with their Article III counterparts to 
be highly regarded. 
89. 345 u.s. 128 (1953). 
90. Id. at 130. 
91. Id. at 132 (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-752, at 6 (1945), 
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 187, 192 
(WilliamS. Rein & Co. 1997) (1946)). 
92. Id. at 133. 
93. See, e.g., Young, supra note 79. 
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Institutional structures say as much as the language of the 
rules that establish those institutions. The language of an 
individual statute can be the trees that obscure the forest. The 
structure of the entire forest reveals the intention of the drafters 
and institution designers. Administrative judges were not intended 
to be independent in the sense of that word that connotes the usual 
judge's attribute. They were meant to be impartial decisionmakers 
and advancers of agency policy, not independent ones. 
Part III described the structure of judicial independence in the 
American system. Do administrative law judges have similar 
characteristics?94 That is, is the independence of administrative 
judges such that it serves as a means to the end of judicial 
independence, namely, protecting impartiality, preserving integrity 
as a separate branch of government, and accountability? The 
answer, of course, is no; administrative judges are not meant to be a 
separate branch of government. The essential differences lie in 
their appointment, their removal, and especially the authority of 
their decisions, which makes their position in the governmental 
cosmos (as part of the executive branch, not an independent branch 
by themselves or part of the judicial branch) perfectly clear. 
Administrative judges are so far less independent from various 
political and structural forces that they occupy positions that are 
different in kind from the Article III and state court judges. 
Administrative judges, though they judge, are not in the first 
instance members of the judicial branch. They are selected and 
renewed by a nonjudicial branch. They have insulation from the 
electorate in a sense, but their agency will feel change in the 
political climate and fortunes of political parties. But what makes 
administrative judges not fundamentally independent is that their 
very decisions are reviewed and subject to reversal on law and policy 
grounds by their agency, their nonjudicial branch agency.95 
One might argue that administrative judges are not 
independent from the legislative branch because they have to follow 
statutes or are not independent from the executive branch because 
they have to follow regulations, but that imposition is no different 
from observing that legislation, or even lawfully adopted 
94. Overwhelmingly, ALJs themselves say that they are independent, 
though they presumably would not ascribe to themselves the same sort of 
independence as Article III judges are granted. Ninety percent of ALJs in a 
1992 survey said that they thought "independent" described their role well. 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 271, 287 (1994). Their opinion is undermined by their own answers to 
other parts of the same survey which indicate high levels of perceived 
interference with decisionmaking. Id. at 278-79. 
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000). 
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administrative regulations, "trumps" the common law and judicial 
power to make law. But, of course, what the administrative judge 
lacks is the judicial review power, the judge's power to interpret 
constitutions and declare the legislation or regulation to be beyond 
the agency's or legislature's power.96 
Article III courts (and analogous state courts) are different in 
the independence realm from administrative judges. Administrative 
judges do not establish precedent in the same sense that courts do. 
A subsequent administrative judge is free to ignore a prior decision 
of another administrative judge of the same "rank" in the same 
agency. 97 Courts, by contrast, make law at every tum. Even the 
most mundane case that seems merely to follow existing precedent 
or apply a statute creates a precedential data point: one more set of 
facts for future courts to use for comparison and contrast purposes.98 
To be sure, both courts and administrative judges apply law 
made by others, but within quite different contexts and constraints. 
Administrative judges apply law created by the legislature, by the 
executive, by courts, and by agencies, just as courts do. But the 
administrative judge's decision is reviewed by the agency, and may 
be reversed by it. The court's decision is reviewed within its own 
branch, the legislative and executive branches having no first 
instance of review of judicial decisions. All that is necessary for an 
administrative judge's decision to be reviewed is an appeal by a 
party. Since the agency is often a party, in many instances even the 
96. See, e.g., U.S. CaNST. art. III; 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000) (detailing powers 
and duties of administrative law judges under the Administrative Procedure 
Act); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-80 (1803). 
97. Strict obedience to precedent is not necessary, but a departure from 
precedent needs to be explained. "Stare decisis is not the rule in administrative 
adjudications. Thus, as a matter of doctrine, administrative adjudicators are 
not required to follow administrative precedent. Rather, administrative law 
has developed a degree of flexibility in its approach to caselaw. On the other 
hand, agencies cannot ignore their prior cases." Koch, supra note 36, at 703 
(footnotes omitted) (citing Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 
F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2003)). Specifically, the Third Circuit held that, under 
the APA, "reviewing courts are to 'hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). If an 
agency departs from its own precedent without a reasoned explanation, the 
agency may be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously." I d. at 229. 
98. Though most judicial opinions create precedent, judicial practices may 
prevent some opinions from being used for comparison or contrast purposes. 
See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging 
in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1483-85 (2004) (criticizing the 
practice of "private judging" whereby judicial opinions are not published, 
removed from publication, or are withdrawn pursuant to stipulation, effectively 
removing any precedential value the opinion may have provided). 
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aggrieved agency itself can institute an appeal to higher authority 
within the agency.99 
Beyond the judicial review of a court's decision, it may be said 
that courts' decisions are always subject to "review" by the 
legislative branch: statutes that the legislature believes judges have 
misapplied may be amended, and new, constitutionally permissible 
legislation to override common law decisions may be enacted. But 
that "review" by other than the judicial branch is hardly the matter-
of-course appeal to higher authority found in the administrative 
judicial setting. 100 To perform this review of courts, the legislature 
must first notice the errant decision. It must overcome inertia and 
the distractions of its myriad other tasks to move on the issue. It 
must have sufficient time in a session to act. It must garner a 
majority for passage. And, in the absence of a supermajority, it 
must have the cooperation of the executive. Even then, it must act 
within its constitutional parameters or the courts will have the 
power to check the legislative action. We regard courts, even with 
this form of legislative oversight, as independent of the other 
branches. Administrative judges, by contrast, are not independent 
of the agency and therefore the nonjudicial branch of which that 
agency is a part. High levels of job security and independent spirit 
notwithstanding, administrative judges' decisions are not 
independent: they are subject to direct review by their own agency. 
Since, as we have seen, judicial independence is a means to an 
end, and since the means is limited by its end, what is the end of the 
degree ofindependence that administrative judges do have? We saw 
that there are two purposes of Article III independence: 
maintaining the judiciary's integrity as a third branch of 
government (which has the further purpose of checking the other 
two branches) and ensuring a lack of external pressure as a means 
of ensuring decisional impartiality. For administrative judges, the 
situation is different. Administrative judge independence is not 
about maintaining the integrity of a third branch of government; 
administrative judges are executive agents, and consequently are 
part of the second branch. Their independence only serves the goal 
of decisional impartiality, and because of its less extensive purpose, 
it is itself less extensive. More accurately, they lack independence, 
99. KOCH, supra note 38, § 11.10. However, agency staff ordinarily may not 
appeal the administrative review to the federal courts. Id. 
100. Justice Powell criticized the legislature in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring), for assuming a judicial function when it 
reviewed an INS decision that Chadha met the statutory requirement for 
permanent residence in the United States. According to Justice Powell, the 
legislature exceeded its constitutional authority when it reviewed the agency's 
decision regarding the rights of a specific individual. I d. 
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and yet must be impartial. 
Some prominent scholars have recognized that judicial 
independence is not an ali-or-nothing proposition. Burbank, in 
particular, has identified "the erroneous assumption that judicial 
independence is a monolith."101 He further specified the problem as 
the idea that "judicial independence has the same value, even if 
instrumental value, no matter what the court."102 The clear 
implication is that different judges will be independent in different 
degrees, depending on the position and function of the courts in 
which they function. Burbank describes it in this way: 
[T]he insight that judicial independence is a means to an end 
(or ends) and not an end in itself suggests that the quantum 
and quality of independence (and accountability) enjoyed by 
different courts in different systems, and indeed by different 
courts within the same system, may not be, and perhaps 
should not be, the same.103 
The fact that administrative judges do not share the high 
degree of independence granted to Article III courts is not, therefore, 
necessarily regrettable. It may, in fact, be a good thing, provided 
that the lesser independence afforded them helps achieve the end of 
the administrative judiciary, which is different, of course, from those 
of the Article III judiciary. What is that end? 
The amount of independence that a judge has, or ought to have, 
is determined by the judge's role; that is, it is determined by the end 
to be served by the judge's activity. Since the end of administrative 
judge independence is impartial decisionmaking, 104 and not the 
maintenance of a separate branch of government, the amount of 
independence that an administrative judge has will be determined 
by the amount that is necessary for impartial decisionmaking. To 
extend this independence beyond that point would be unwise. 
What passes as a demand for independence of the 
administrative law judge is mostly about impartiality;105 
administrative judges were not meant to be a check on the other 
branches, which is the other, and indeed primary, end of the 
101. Burbank, supra note 38, at 325. 
102. Id. 
103. ld. at 325-26. 
104. See supra Part II. 
105. 92 CONG. REC. 13, 2164 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 295, 337 (WilliamS. Rein & Co. 1997) (1946) (stating 
that the APA, which created administrative judges, "will result in a greater 
assurance of justice at the hands of administrative agencies"). The legislative 
history makes no mention of an Article III-style judiciary, but only of an 
impartial one. 
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independence of Article III judges. Indeed, administrative judges 
are called "judges" only in the sense that they are impartial 
decisionmakers. 106 Even before Congress began calling them judges, 
in the original Administrative Procedure Act, the legislative history 
makes use of the term in order to describe the role, and therefore 
the attributes, of administrative law judges. Congress decided that 
the "provisions [of the act] mean that presiding officers 
[administrative judges] will be required to conduct themselves in the 
manner in which people think they should-that is, as judges and 
not as the representatives of factions or special interests."107 
Congress stressed separation from "factions or special interests," not 
from the rest of the executive branch. We can see, then, that 
Congress intended that the provisions of the act secure a certain 
amount of independence for administrative judges as a means 
toward impartiality of decisionmaking, whereas for Article III 
judges it is a means both for impartiality and the maintenance of a 
separate branch of government. 
That administrative judges are independent in the sense of 
fostering impartiality is not open to dispute. 108 The "[e]ssential[s] to 
true [judicial] independence are life tenure, salary protection, and 
removal for cause subject to a constitutionally adequate 
procedure."109 Administrative judges have a measure of all these 
things in order to protect their impartiality, although, as shall be 
discussed later, they have them to a much lesser degree than Article 
III judges. 
Courts have affirmed the fact that administrative judges have 
this measure of independence which cannot be infringed. The 
Supreme Court and the APA have "conferred upon ALJs a right of 
independence, the invasion of which present[s] a justiciable 
controversy."11° Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has not yet 
106. See supra Part II. 
107. 92 CONG. REC. 5, 5650 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 295, 364 (WilliamS. Rein & Co. 1997) (1946). 
108. Not even, it seems, by administrative judges, who generally insist that 
they are not independent, or at least not independent enough. Studies, 
however, show that the vast majority of ALJs consider themselves independent 
at least in regard to impartiality. In one survey, only nine percent of non-Social 
Security ALJs and twenty-six percent of Social Security ALJs said that 
pressure to render decisions differently was a problem. See Koch, supra note 
94, at 278. While these numbers are unnecessarily high, those judges who do 
not fall under ALJ protection found much less significant problems, indicating 
that it is not structural difficulties which generate this partial lack of 
impartiality-oriented independence. Id. at 278-79. 
109. Larkin, supra note 58, at 67. 
110. Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias m 
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1532, 1542 (1995). 
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confirmed these appellate court decisions, many lower courts have 
decided administrative judge independence cases so consistently 
that they have, in the words of one of these courts itself, produced a 
"qualified right of decisional independence."m The Second Circuit 
held that Congress "vested hearing examiners . . . with a limited 
independence from the agencies they served."112 However, even 
when courts have defended administrative judge independence, they 
have always qualified that independence. As the Second Circuit 
ascribed only a "limited independence" to administrative. judges, 113 
other courts have stated even more explicitly that administrative 
judges possess only a certain, small degree of independence. 
Another court has held that "[t]he ALJ's independence is not 
unlimited. The ALJ is subject to the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the agency and is duty-bound to apply these 
rules."114 The courts consistently affirm that administrative judges 
are only partly independent.115 
This lesser independence is not necessarily a bad thing; it is 
important to remember that "[i]ncreased judicial independence is 
not always better."116 Because judicial independence is a means, not 
an end in itself, it is only good insofar as it is conducive toward its 
end. The end of the administrative judge independence is 
impartiality, whereas the end of Article III independence includes 
the maintenance of a separate branch of government. How can we 
know, however, that the end of administrative judge independence 
is merely impartiality? The answer lies in the role of the 
administrative judge, which is determined by her place in the 
government. The administrative judge cannot be independent for 
the sake of the maintenance of the judicial branch for the simple 
reason that she is part of one of the other branches, the executive.117 
111. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Galin, supra 
note 110, at 1541-43. 
112. Nash, 613 F.2d at 14. 
113. Id. 
114. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated 
on other grounds by Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). 
115. See Goodman v. Svahn, 614 F. Supp. 726, 728 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating 
that no "larger right of decisional independence exists" for administrative 
judges beyond that granted in the APA); Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. 
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) ("[T]he ALJ's right to decisional 
independence is qualified."). 
116. Cross, supra note 56, at 195. 
117. Young, supra note 79, at 42 ("Traditionally, the concept [of judicial 
independence] is seen as including both decisional independence . . . and 
institutional or branch independence .... Administrative law judges obviously 
do not have branch independence. However, if the public is to be assured of 
optimally neutral, impartial, and fair decisions in administrative adjudication, 
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Administrative judges are part of the executive branch.118 This 
statement is obvious on its face. The administrative judge is not 
properly a "judge" except in the sense that he is an impartial 
decisionmaker;119 he is definitely not a judge in the sense of being 
part of the judicial branch.120 The failure to make this distinction-
between "judge" as a decisionmaker and "judge" as a member of the 
judicial branch of government-is doubtlessly responsible for much 
of the confusion on the issue of administrative judge independence. 
The distinction is, however, an elementary one and necessary for 
any proper understanding of either administrative judges or the 
Article III judiciary. 
This distinction is chiefly relevant in that it makes perfectly 
clear that when dealing with the Article III judiciary and the 
administrative judiciary, one is dealing with two entirely separate 
bodies with two distinct roles. The administrative judiciary is not 
simply a part of the "American judiciary;" it is an executive 
judiciary, part of the executive branch and designed to serve the 
ends of the executive branch, to administer. The Article III 
judiciary, on the other hand, is a separate branch of government and 
fulfills a very different role. 
The role of the Article III judiciary is to exist as an independent 
branch of government, able to strike down the unconstitutional 
actions of the other two branches. This is the kind of independence 
which makes the American (Article III) judiciary distinct. Many 
scholars have held this opinion. Cross has asserted that judicial 
independence is "freedom from control or pressure by the other 
political branches of government."121 He cited a number of 
prominent cases to that effect, stating that the purpose of judicial 
independence is to help balance the courts against the elected 
it is necessary that administrative law judges have decisional independence."). 
118. Except for those in independent agencies. See Neal Devins, Unitariness 
and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency 
Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 257 (1994). 
119. See Young, supra note 79, at 42. 
120. This would be true even if a separate corps were established for 
administrative judges. While they would appear then to be a body distinct from 
the executive, in reality they would still be a part of it, since their decisions 
would not only still be reviewable and reversible by the agencies, but also 
subject to judicial review, not in the way a lower court's decision is reviewable, 
but in the way that an executive action is reviewable. See Felter, supra note 83, 
at 22 ("Whether ALJs work directly for agencies or are in more independent 
'central panels' of ALJs where they are not directly under any single agency, 
they act on behalf of those agencies. As such, they are often expected to help 
achieve agency objectives."). 
121. Cross, supra note 56, at 195. 
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branches. 122 
Kaufman, in his thorough article on judicial independence, 
argued in another way for the same meaning of the term: 
Judicial independence is not a cliche conjured up by those who 
seek to prevent encroachments by the other branches of 
government. The term is one of art, defined to achieve the 
essential objective of the separation of powers that justice be 
rendered without fear or bias, and free of prejudice. 123 
Kaufman's article traced the history of the judiciary in England 
and America and determined that the Framers, by founding an 
independent judiciary, intended to rectify the mistake ofthe English 
Constitution, which placed the judiciary under the control of 
Parliament and, therefore, subject to pressures from the 
Parliament.124 He observed that the Framers rejected several plans 
for the judiciary that "would have prevented the judiciary from 
effectively checking legislative violations of the constitutional 
framework,"125 which, he contended, is the purpose of judicial 
independence. If the judiciary were not independent, he argued, 
"the Constitution's promise of a government of limited powers could 
be broken with utter impunity"126 because "the legislative and 
executive powers" would not be "kept within the limits prescribed by 
[the Constitution] ."127 
The purpose of judicial independence, then, according to 
Kaufman, is to maintain a judiciary which can impartially pass 
judgment upon the actions of the other branches. This last phrase is 
the most important element of independence; indeed, Kaufman 
wrote that "[i]t is this additional step [of making the judiciary 
independent of the legislative and executive powers], inconceivable 
in England, that · made the American Constitution truly 
revolutionary."128 Judicial independence for Kaufman is for the 
purpose of checking the other branches.129 Independence in the 
Article III judiciary is therefore defined by the role which is given to 
Article III judges: passing judgment upon the actions of the other 
two branches. 
122. See id. at 196. 
123. Kaufman, Essence of Judicial Independence, supra note 38, at 701. 
124. Id. at 672-87. 
125. Id. at 686. 
126. Id. at 687. 
127. Id. at 686-87. 
128. Id. at 687. 
129. See also Geyh, supra note 38, at 162 (stating that the purpose of judicial 
independence is "to facilitate impartial decisionmaking and preserve the 
integrity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government"). 
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The role of administrative judges, on the other hand, entails 
neither the same purpose nor the same powers. In his article on the 
debates about administrative judges, Justice Scalia argued that 
administrative judges and Article III judges perform fundamentally 
different roles in society. Article III judges have "authority to 
overrule the actions of the two elected branches. No such power 
inheres in the presiding officers at administrative hearings, even if 
Congress chooses to call them judges."130 So Article III judges 
perform a role in society which demands an independence that 
administrative judges do not and cannot have: 131 they make 
decisions which can override the actions of the other two political 
branches. Administrative judges, on the other hand, are part of one 
of those two branches; their decisions are subject to a judicial review 
not like a lower court's decision, but like other executive actions. 132 
Because of their role as an executive judiciary, they cannot have 
a very extensive independence. It is important to remember that 
"[w]hether any executive branch agency can actually be completely 
independent is problematic."133 Are administrative judges, however, 
truly part of the executive branch? Or are they a fast-developing 
split from the executive, soon to be absorbed into the judiciary? The 
answer is certainly the former. Despite the safeguards given to 
administrative judges to assure their decisional independence (i.e., 
their impartiality) from the executive branch, they are still 
unquestionably part of that branch/34 which is proven by their 
complete dependence upon their agencies. That dependence is 
manifested in at least four distinct ways: first, by their appointment 
130. Scalia, supra note 86, at 61-62. 
131. Some administrative judges even acknowledge this fact openly. See, 
e.g., Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Premises, 
Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 29 (1997) ("ALJs may 
not have the same level of authority, power, or practical independence as 
judicial branch judges."). 
132. Judicial review of administrative judge decisions is arguably identical 
to that of any other executive act. While it maintains certain aspects of normal 
judicial review, such as a certain degree of deference in matters of fact, when 
judges remand administrative judge decisions they are not remanding them as 
they would to a lower court; they are rejecting an executive action and requiring 
that its consideration be repeated. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (explaining 
judicial review of administrative actions). 
133. Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 80-81 (1994). 
134. While this fact is obvious, scholars, including administrative law 
scholars, have occasionally found it necessary to point it out. See, e.g., Young, 
supra note 131, at 16 ("[T)he obvious fact that the two groups are formally in 
different branches of government, even if 'functionally comparable."') (footnote 
omitted). 
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to office; second, by their evaluation while in office; third, by their 
removal from office; and fourth, by the permanency of their 
decisions relative to their agencies. 
A. Administrative Judge Dependence in Appointment 
As regards their appointment, administrative judges are 
completely dependent, of course, upon the will of the executive, 
whereas the appointment of Article III judges is tempered by "the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate."135 Administrative judges are 
appointed by their agencies, which are instructed to appoint "as 
many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings."136 
The officials who do the appointing, however, are all appointed-and 
removed-by the president and the president alone. The advice and 
consent of the Senate is entirely unnecessary, rendering 
administrative judges completely, and obviously, dependent upon 
the executive branch. With the necessity of Senate confirmation, 
the dependence on the executive for the Article III judiciary is 
weakened and diluted. The threat of Senate refusal or even of a 
minority filibuster restrains the extent to which the executive 
controls the views and nature of the judicial appointees. 
B. Administrative Judge Dependence in Evaluation 
The evaluation process of administrative judges is so contrary to 
independence that Article III judges would never tolerate the system 
being applied to themselves nor would Article III permit them to 
suffer such a system. Administrative judges are evaluated, and 
therefore often promoted, by a system similar to "a supervisor 
evaluating a subordinate employee in a traditional management-by-
objectives context, or at least contains aspects of such a process."137 
This method, however, "would no doubt be considered anathema in 
the judicial branch"138 because of its threat to judicial independence: 
"[I]t never was contemplated that ALJs would be [similarly] immune 
from any performance reviews."139 In fact, in the years immediately 
following the passage of the AP A, the Civil Service Commission 
made evaluations of hearing examiners which resulted in the 
retention of only seventy percent of currently employed examiners. 140 
135. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
136. 5 u.s.c. § 3105 (2000). 
137. Young, supra note 131, at 17. 
138. ld. 
139. JeffreyS. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing 
an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
u. 589, 592 (1993). 
140. See Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the 
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After the Commission had absorbed an enormous amount of flak 
and endured many lawsuits from those examiners, it reversed many 
of its decisions141 and the evaluation of administrative judges was 
entirely abandoned. 142 However, despite the difficulties of the 
process, it is clear that by current law administrative judges are 
subject to performance evaluations by the executive branch, 143 which 
shows their reduced independence relative to Article III judges. 
C. Administrative Judge Dependence in Removal 
The process for removal of administrative judges, too, is much 
more political than that of Article III judges, though it, too, provides 
protection to a certain extent. Disciplinary removals for both types 
of judges must meet the same standard: they can only be removed 
for "good cause."144 Article III judges, however, can only be removed 
by "the blunderbuss of accountability devices, the impeachment 
process,"145 for failure to meet the "good Behaviour"146 standard, 
which is an extraordinarily complex procedure and is almost never 
undertaken. 147 Administrative judges, however, can be acted against 
"for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems 
Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before 
the Board."148 A number of factors make this removal very different 
from that of an Article III judge. The Merit Systems Protection 
Board ("MSPB") consists of only three members, who are appointed, 
like Article III judges, "by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate."149 Three members are more easily 
persuaded, for good or bad reasons, than the large body of the 
Senate. Furthermore, while decisions of the MSPB are sometimes 
subject to judicial review, they are never put into the political 
Administrative Procedure Act, 63 HARv. L. REV. 737, 753 (1950). 
141. Id. at 753-56. 
142. See Lubbers, supra note 139, at 593. 
143. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989). It is also true, 
however, that "the agency won the right to bring charges against low producing 
ALJs but was handed a virtually insurmountable burden of proof." Lubbers, 
supra note 139, at 599-600. 
144. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2000). 
145. Geyh, supra note 38, at 163. 
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
147. See Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX. 
REv. L. & PoL. 117, 133-41 (1998) (discussing impeachment proceedings against 
twelve judges, including John Pickering, Samuel Chase, and Walter Nixon, 
among others). 
148. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). This specific process applies only to ALJs. Id. 
149. 5 U.S.C. § 1201; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the 
president "shall have Power ... [to] nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, [to] appoint ... Judges of the Supreme Court"). 
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process, making removal of an administrative judge much more 
subject to arbitrariness. 150 
This is not to say, however, that administrative judges can be 
removed arbitrarily or easily. Most federal employees can be 
removed under a much less exacting standard; the decision to 
remove can be "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of 
the service."151 Federal employees are also entitled to a more 
minimal procedure than administrative judges.152 Furthermore, the 
MSPB demands "a high threshold of proof in agency actions against 
ALJs."153 These combined factors have led some scholars to the 
result that "ALJs [have] essentially the same protections that the 
Constitution gives Article III judges."154 This, however, is not quite 
true. Justice Scalia has noted this similarity in protections given to 
Article III judges and administrative judges, but would not equate 
the two. While Article III judges are almost entirely independent in 
tenure and salary (except for that mostly illusory threat, 
impeachment), administrative judges are only "largely independent 
in matters of tenure and compensation."155 Their tenure and salary 
150. It is true, however, that this avenue has been taken so rarely that it 
could arguably be considered a dead letter. That opinion, however, does not 
seem reflected by the facts. As recently as 1999, suit was brought and won 
dismissing an administrative judge for good cause. See Carr v. SSA, 185 F.3d 
1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Furthermore, though lost, another case was brought in 
1984 to remove an administrative judge, which establishes that no one denies 
the ability of the MSPB to so remove. See SSA Dep't of Health and Human 
Servs. v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57 (1984). Finally, in 1980, another case was 
brought and won for removal of an administrative judge. See In re Chocallo, 2 
M.S.P.B. 20, 1 M.S.P.R. 605 (1980). So while it is true that only twenty-four 
cases have been brought for removal of an administrative judge for good cause, 
and only five of these have been won, this statistic does not invalidate the fact 
that the standard is both viable and less stringent than that governing Article 
III judges. For the statistics, see Morell E. Mullins, Manual for Administrative 
Law Judges, 23 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 116 (2004). 
151. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2000). 
152. See id. § 7513(b)-(d). An employee is entitled to thirty days notice, 
unless the agency has reason to believe that said employee has committed a 
crime that carries a jail sentence; at least seven days in which to respond; to be 
represented by an attorney; and to be given a written decision justifying his 
removal at the earliest possible date. !d. § 7513(b). The agency may provide a 
hearing. !d. § 7513(c). The employee is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Id. § 7513(d). It can easily be seen 
that the administrative judge enjoys substantially more protection, even beyond 
the standard for removal. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48 for the 
protections afforded to administrative judges. 
153. Galin, supra note 110, at 1538. 
154. Id. 
155. Scalia, supra note 86, at 59 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 46 
(1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 235, 
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are still much more easily adjusted or removed than are those of any 
Article III judge. Administrative judges are not, therefore, as 
independent as Article III judges in the protections given them 
against arbitrary removal, though they are more protected than the 
average federal employee. 
Furthermore, the MSPB is not the only path to removal of 
administrative judges; many other methods for removing them are 
available. First, an administrative judge can be suspended or 
removed by the head of an agency (who is an executive appointee) 
"when he considers that action necessary in the interests of national 
security."156 Mter a certain, very minimal, required procedure/57 the 
decision of the agency is final, 158 and it is not subject to judicial 
review except insofar as such review is necessary to ensure 
compliance with that minimal procedure.159 Second, an 
administrative judge can be removed by a "reduction-in-force," 
which is simply a reduction in the federal workforce, the 
requirements of which are set by the Office of Personnel 
Management, an executive agency. 160 This is nothing like the tenure 
protections afforded to Article III judges.161 Even if these methods 
280 (William S. Rein & Co. 1997) (1946)) (emphasis added). See also S. REP. 
No. 79-752, at 29 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 189, 215 (William S. Rein & Co. 1997) (1946) (explaining 
that "the tenure and compensation requirements" of the bill were "designed to 
make examiners largely independent") (emphasis added). 
156. 5 U.S.C. § 7532(a) (2000). This provision is not affected by the 
limitation on removal in§ 7521(a); see id. § 7521(b)(A). 
157. All that is required is that the suspended or removed employee, if he 
"has a permanent or indefinite appointment," "has completed his probationary 
or trial period," and "is a citizen of the United States," is that he be told in 
writing of the charges against him within thirty days, that he be given the 
opportunity to answer the charges within thirty days of being told in writing, 
that he be given a hearing by an agency authority (the same agency that has 
suspended or removed him), if he so requests, that the head of the agency 
review the decision, and that he be given the head of the agency's decision in 
writing. !d. § 7532(c). This is hardly the sort of constant checks given to those 
who would impeach Article III justices, even when they appear to be national 
security risks. 
158. ld. § 7532(b). 
159. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 64 (1950), affd 341 U.S. 
918 (1951). 
160. 5 U.S.C. § 3502. This provision is also not affected by the limitation on 
removal in§ 7521(a). See id. § 7521(b)(B). 
161. It is true that "[t]he prohibition against removal except for good cause, 
after hearing, has been broadly construed," and that "the APA is to be given a 
generous interpretation in light of the over-riding objective of hearing officer 
independence," but that does not change the fact that the protections granted to 
administrative judges by the AP A are nothing like that granted to judges by the 
Constitution of 1789. Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative 
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and constraints are rarely employed, they remove the institutional 
structures supporting independence of action by administrative 
judges. 
D. Administrative Judge Dependence in Finality 
Most fundamentally, administrative judges are subservient to 
their agencies in the permanency of their decisions. Except in the 
limited manner outlined by the constitutional separation of powers 
doctrine, genuinely independent judges in the courts are immune 
from executive override; administrative judges are not only subject 
to it, but also often require executive affirmation in order for their 
decisions to be final. 162 Clearly, they are not as independent as 
Article III judges in this respect. 
Judges in the judicial branch are independent in the sense that 
their decisions are final. Of course, they are subject to review, but 
only from within the judicial branch. Even if the legislature chooses 
to pass a statute to override judicial precedent, the decisions of the 
courts in those particular cases cannot be altered; their decisions are 
truly independent of the other two branches. Judges under Article 
III thus have the greatest possible amount of independence short of 
an absolute authority; administrative judges, on the other hand, are 
crucially dependent, both in that their decisions often require 
executive affirmation and in that they are always subject to 
executive review. 
The APA allows the agency to affirm, alter, or completely 
override the decision of the administrative judge.163 The Act 
provides that "[w]hen the presiding employee makes an initial 
decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency 
without further proceedings,"164 which seems to imply independence. 
However, the Act further specifies that this is the case "unless there 
is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time 
provided by rule."165 The appeal can be made by either party in the 
dispute; indeed, often one of the parties is the agency itself, and it 
can appeal the decision to itself. 166 Upon appeal, the agency "has all 
Procedure Act, 32 TuLSA L.J. 203, 211 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
162. Of course, an appeal or motion must come first. See infra notes 163-68 
and accompanying text. 
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 557. 
164. ld. § 557(b). 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Kenneth Nickolai, Strengthening the Skills of Administrative 
Law Judges, 20 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 263, 265 (2000) ("(Jludges (are] 
employed by the agency whose actions they are often reviewing."); Schwartz, 
supra note 161, at 204-05 (stating that the agency is often "the opposite party"). 
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the powers which it would have in making the initial decision,"167 
meaning that it can conduct, if it so wishes, a completely de novo 
review of the administrative judge's initial decision. Indeed, one 
court has held that "[o]n matters of law and policy ... ALJs are 
entirely subject to the agency."168 
Most Article III judges are, indeed, subject to being overruled by 
a higher authority. However, Article III judges can only be 
overruled within the judicial branch; administrative judges can be 
overruled by the agency. 169 Furthermore, Article III judges can only 
be overruled in findings of fact when they are clearly erroneous, 
whereas to apply this rule to agencies reviewing administrative 
judges' decisions "goes too far." 170 An agency has "the power of 
ruling on facts and policies in the first instance."171 It is clear that, 
under the APA, "[t]he powers of an agency reviewing an initial or 
recommended decision of its examiner are greater than those of an 
appellate court reviewing the decision of a trial judge."172 While the 
administrative judge's findings are certainly given significant 
weight, 173 none of them, not even the factual determinations, are 
binding on the agency in review.174 The agency is omnipotent when 
it comes to administrative judge decisions. 175 
167. 5 u.s.c. § 557(b). 
168. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 
(D.D.C. 1984). 
169. See, e.g., Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 244 (lOth Cir. 1988) ("The 
Secretary may review any decision of an ALJ, and the Secretary, acting through 
the Appeals Council, makes the final judicially reviewable decision in a given 
case."). 
170. FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955). 
171. Id. 
172. NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1963). 
173. Though not as much weight as a trial judge's are given by a superior 
court. While the "clearly erroneous" standard must be met before an appellate 
judge can reverse a trial judge's finding of fact, the agency need only meet the 
"substantial evidence" test that the administrative judge was wrong. See 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). There are, however, a few 
additional and relatively unburdensome strictures which must be observed by 
the overruling agency. For example, "it is well settled that administrative 
agencies must give reasons for their decisions," and "[i]f the Appeals Council 
rejects the ALJ's decision, it must fully articulate its reasons." Reyes, 845 F.2d 
at 244-45. Also, courts in review give such rejections heightened scrutiny. Id. 
at 245; see also Aylett v. Sec'y ofHous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1565 (lOth 
Cir. 1995); Bechtel Const. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11th Cir. 
1995). Also, "[s]tates generally have adopted a similar position either by 
statute or case law." Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1368 (footnotes omitted). 
174. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494-97 
(1951). 
175. Indeed, one state administrative judge considered this omnipotence to 
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In effect, administrative judges were originally merely agents of 
the commission or board at the top of the agency. Such agents were 
needed to handle the business of the agency when it grew beyond 
the capacity of the board or commission members. Agencies retain 
all their powers when reviewing administrative judge decisions, as if 
they had presided over the hearing in the first instance. 176 Many 
"decisions" of administrative judges are mere suggestions or 
recommendations to the agency.177 Article III judges are under no 
such authority. 
Indeed, this particular facet of administrative judge 
independence receives wide support from all communities, including 
some administrative judges.178 Administrative judges, unlike Article 
III judges, exist in order to further the policies of the executive 
branch, specifically the agency for which they judge, through the 
impartial adjudication of disputes. Allowing administrative judges 
final authority over policy and perhaps even over fact findings, 
however, would thwart that end. Flanagan argues that granting 
final authority "will significantly alter state contested case 
adjudication by creating inconsistencies between the agencies' 
articulated policies and the results achieved through contested case 
litigation and will adversely affect the agency's enforcement of its 
statutory mandate."179 Administrative judges would be rendered 
capable of deciding cases in contradiction with the stated policies of 
the executive branch. 
While it is undeniable that sometimes such decisions must be 
made, it is definitely arguable that administrative judges are the 
proper people to make them.180 It is the purpose of the Article III 
courts to pass judgment on the lawfulness of executive policies; it is 
the purpose of the administrative judiciary to pass judgments in 
be indispensable: 
If the ALJ exercises true judicial independence and chooses from 
among these conflicting analytical approaches without regard to the 
direction of the executive administration, then the electoral 
mandate-the voice of the people through which the executive officer 
obtained her or his office-will not be realized and indeed the ALJ will 
elevate the position to that of a sovereign. 
McNeil, supra note 85, at 520. 
176. 5 u.s.c. § 557(b). 
177. Id. § 554(d). 
178. See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 85, at 515. 
179. Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1362. 
180. See id. at 1398 ("[A]gency review produces results that are supported by 
the law and the facts."). Considering that at least seventy-five percent of ALJ 
decisions are adopted entirely by the agency, id. at 1365, one might think that 
finality would be superfluous; however, the desire for Article III independence 
is not so easily satiated. 
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order to further them. Such authority is irreconcilable with their 
role as an executive judiciary;181 furthermore, there is reliable 
evidence that it will produce uncertainty in the law and a loss in 
accountability, and will nullify agency experience in applying the 
law and agency discretion in applying its own rules. 182 
Would uniting all administrative judges into a central panel 
serve to achieve genuine or Article III independence among 
administrative judges? The central panel proposal is 
enthusiastically supported by administrative judges themselves, 
who often denounce the present system as depriving administrative 
judges of their due independence. Palmer, for example, stated that 
"[t]he 40 years that have passed since the enactment of the APA 
have revealed the ALJ system to have many strengths but the 
subordination of the administrative judiciary to agency dominion 
has proven to be its one intrinsic flaw which now requires 
remedy."183 What is that remedy? Palmer would propose the central 
panel solution to attempts by agencies to control their 
administrative judges.184 Many states have such a central panel in 
place already, and Palmer says that "[e]ach state has reported the 
new system to be a complete success."185 Nor are administrative 
judges the first to make this proposal with such enthusiasm. 
A substantial minority of the Committee which proposed the 
APA to Congress supported a central panel: "Instead of establishing 
the examiners as an independent corps, as recommended in the 
minority report, the responsibility for protecting critical elements in 
the employment of hearing examiners was entrusted to the Civil 
Service Commission."186 Also, "[t]he Judicial Administration 
181. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: Balancing 
Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 2 
(1999) ("ALJ finality ... risks undermining core executive branch functions and 
thwarting accountability norms."). Indeed, Rossi even questions the 
constitutionality of the idea. I d. at 10. ("[T]he cases are decidedly unhelpful in 
addressing whether delegation of final order authority to an ALJ outside of a 
politically accountable agency is constitutional."). 
182. See Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1399-1411. Flanagan defends these 
views extensively and ably, and his article has never received an adequate 
response from anyone of an opposing outlook. His final conclusion-that "the 
executive department has lost some of its ability to enforce the law," id. at 1410, 
because of ALJ finality-is another cogent and unanswered argument in favor 
of continuing the present system of agency review. 
183. Victor W. Palmer, The Administrative Procedure Act: After 40 Years, 
Still Searching for Independence, JUDGES' J., Winter 1987, at 34, 39. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 37; see also Fuchs, supra note 140, at 739 ("[C]orps of highly 
responsible hearing officers [was] originally put forward by the Attorney 
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Division passed a resolution in 1983 favoring the passage of 
legislation to establish federal administrative law judges as an 
independent corps."187 More recently, a 1992 Administrative 
Conference of the United States study recommended against the 
central panel approach for the federal administrative judiciary.188 
Other scholars have considered the central panel proposal as only 
one way of implementing the ultimate goal of ensuring "[w]hat is 
important," which "is that the courtJcorps not be part of the agency 
on whose actions it is to sit in judgment."189 The hunger of 
administrative judges for the additional independence that a central 
corps would grant them and that of legal authorities for a more 
independent administrative judiciary is obvious. Would the 
increased independence of a central panel ultimately affect the 
nature of independence enjoyed by administrative judges? Not 
really. 
Administrative judges perform a certain role in government, 
and the organization used to achieve that role would not change the 
central fact of agency review of administrative judge decisions. 
Even administrative judges themselves recognize this fact; Felter 
stated it explicitly, arguing that "[w]hether ALJs work directly for 
agencies or are in more independent 'central panels' of ALJs where 
they are not directly under any single agency, they act on behalf of 
those agencies," and that therefore "they are often expected to help 
achieve agency objectives."190 While the central panel may or may 
not increase the impartiality of administrative judges, which would 
be conducive to their role and therefore a positive change in the 
organization of the administrative judiciary, it would not render 
them independent in a way comparable to that of Article III judges. 
There is, in fact, significant evidence in support of the proposal 
of many administrative judges that a central panel would increase 
the efficiency of administrative adjudication as well as the 
impartiality of administrative adjudicators.191 Indeed, "[t]he basic 
General's Committee."). 
187. Palmer, supra note 183, at 39. 
188. PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1059 (1992). 
189. Hoffman & Cihlar, supra note 2, at 878; see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming 
Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) ("(T]he central panel promotes independence 
... [b]y removing ALJs from the managerial auspices of the agencies whose 
matters they adjudicate .... "). 
190. Felter, supra note 83, at 22. 
191. Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia admitted the possible truth of this 
statement in his famous piece on the administrative judiciary, in which he 
comes down somewhat ambivalently, but more negatively than positively, on 
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purpose of the central panel system is to give ALJs a certain amount 
of independence from the agencies over whose proceedings they 
preside,"192 which will presumably ensure an impartiality which is 
unachievable when they are employees of the agencies. Further 
claimed benefits include "the likelihood of fairness, in fact, the 
appearance of fairness, case management and workload efficiencies, 
cost efficiencies, decisional independence, [and] protection of hearing 
officers."193 The idea can, from the perspective of most 
administrative judges, only be praised, and its effects would be 
universally beneficial. 
In fact, many states have already implemented a central panel 
for their administrative judiciaries, and the results seem to be 
uniformly positive. Hoberg notes that "[t]he general consensus is 
that central panel systems have worked well in the states."194 One 
commentator argued that a central panel increases professionalism, 
or at least the appearance of professionalism, among administrative 
judges;195 another, remarking about Oregon's recent establishment of 
a central panel, appeared to believe the measure to be the final 
realization of Utopia: "This [the central panel] is not simply good 
government. It is best government."196 But does the central panel 
really serve the ends of executive adjudication? 
This issue is tied very closely to that of administrative judge 
judicial independence, just as is the issue of administrative judge 
finality discussed earlier.197 "Both central panels and ALJ finality 
are intimately related to ALJ independence,"198 since both are an 
attempt to distance the administrative judge from the agency-and, 
ultimately, the executive branch-of which she is a part. Flanagan 
argues that "[t]he rationale for central panels, whether in state or 
federal government, is the desire for the institutional independence 
the central panel proposal. "The problem of improper influence," he argues, 
"would also be solved by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified 
ALJ corps, headed by an independent administrator." Scalia, supra note 86, at 
79 (footnote omitted). He also, however, makes another observation: that the 
central panel is only valuable insofar as it does not alter the role of the 
administrative judiciary. !d. 
192. Hoberg, supra note 133, at 76. 
193. Id. 
194. ld. at 78. 
195. See generally Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within 
an Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 
445 (2001) (explaining how the Office of Hearing Examiners has strengthened 
the professional standing of Minnesota's administrative judiciary). 
196. Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT'L Ass'N 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57, 89 (2003). 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 162-68. 
198. Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1382. 
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of ALJs."199 In other words, the central panel is an attempt to 
transform administrative judges from being administrative law 
judges to being essentially equivalent to Article III judges, passing 
judgment upon the executive branch and free to advance or hinder 
executive policies as they see fit. 200 While central panels vary 
greatly in their organization,201 and, therefore, in the degree of such 
separation they permit,202 insofar as they further the rupture of the 
administrative judiciary from the executive branch, they are an 
undesirable development in the law. 
A primary symptom of this severance by central panels of 
administrative judges from their executive adjudicative role is the 
power they are sometimes given to enter final decisions, with the 
agency having no power of review. While it is true that "ALJ 
independence in the central panel structure does not require ALJ 
finality,"203 many people support the central panel for the specific 
purpose of achieving this finality. According to the Model Act, an 
administrative judge can sometimes issue a final decision and 
sometimes initial decisions;204 under the current federal AP A, 
however, they can issue only initial decisions.205 Does this power to 
make final decisions alter the role of the administrative judge as an 
executive judiciary? Essentially, such a power transforms the 
administrative judge into a carbon copy of an Article III judge, able 
to render judgments on the actions of the executive branch without 
199. Id. 
200. See Rossi, supra note 181, at 10 ("ALJ finality risks thwarting agency 
accountability, leaving law and policy decisions in the hands of ALJs.") 
(emphasis added). While Rossi here is not speaking precisely about central 
panels themselves, ALJ finality is seen only within the central panel model. Id. 
at 3-5. 
201. See, e.g., Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State 
Central Panels, 21 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235, 236-44 (2001) 
(comparing central panel organizations in Maryland, North Dakota, and Texas); 
Hoberg, supra note 133, at 78-89 (examining central panel organizations in a 
number of states); McNeil, supra note 85, at 483-94 (discussing various aspects 
of the central panels of several states). 
202. In fact, some organizations of central panels allow no such separation. 
See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1383 ("ALJ independence in the central 
panel structure does not require ALJ finality."). However, it is also clear that 
"providing ALJs institutional independence [through the central panel] makes 
the argument for ALJ finality more appealing," id., and it is the extent to which 
this is true that ought to govern our decision about whether or not to implement 
the central panel proposal, see infra text accompanying note 211. 
203. Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1383. 
204. McNeil, supra note 85, at 497. 
205. Unless there is no appeal; whenever there is, or when the agency 
simply decides that it would like to review, the initial decision is not final until 
the agency confirms it. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000). 
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any review from that branch. That is not the role for which 
administrative judges were created.206 
Perhaps, however, justice can only be served feasibly by 
granting judicial authority to administrative judges. The core of 
this debate is the role of administrative judges in advancing agency 
policy. If administrative judges are part of the executive branch 
meant to advance agency policy, then naturally they cannot pass 
judgments that remake that policy, and their independence only 
extends to the protection of their role of advancing that policy; if, on 
the other hand, they are not part of the executive branch and not 
meant to advance agency policy, then what role is left to them but 
the judicial one, judging the executive as they see fit? While 
administrative judges are certainly charged with the impartial 
administration of justice, they are charged with that administration 
in accordance with the policies of the executive and the particular 
agency. If they were meant to be independent of the executive 
branch, Congress would have established administrative courts in 
the judicial branch, which is certainly within its power.207 The fact 
that it instead established executive courts indicates that it had 
something else in mind. These executive courts are meant to 
administer justice impartially, and they do so for a massive number 
of Americans, far more than does the judicial branch itself.208 The 
judicial branch could have been expanded to encompass the same 
206. See, e.g., Pat McCarran, Foreword to ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY III (William S. Rein & Co. 1997) (1946) (stating that the 
Administrative Procedure Act was "intended as a guide to him who seeks fair 
play and equal rights under law, as well as to those invested with executive 
authority"). Nowhere is any mention made of giving administrative judges 
judicial-branch authority; they are intended to be "invested with executive 
authority," and therefore part of the executive branch, nothing more. See also 
Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1388, who makes an excellent argument worthy of 
quoting in its entirety: 
Another argument made in support of ALJ finality is that it protects 
ALJ independence. The argument that ALJ finality enhances ALJ 
independence is true, in the sense that final order authority does 
make the ALJ completely independent of the agency. The argument, 
however, confuses the means with the end. ALJ independence is an 
important factor in administrative adjudication when it eliminates 
improper agency influence, but certainly, it is not the purpose of 
agency adjudication to make ALJs independent. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
207. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). 
208. See, e.g., O'Keeffe, supra note 2, at 591 ("ALJs process a larger case 
load than United States district judges and affect the rights of a larger number 
of citizens .... ") (footnote omitted). 
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volume of cases, and the need for an executive judiciary could have 
been thereby eliminated. Such a judiciary, however, serves 
purposes beyond simply the administration of justice; it also helps 
further executive goals by administering justice according to the 
interpretations of the executive branch. If administrative judges are 
not kept subject to agency interpretations of the law-as they are so 
kept by the mechanism of agency review209 -then they have ceased 
to be an executive judiciary, and one of the most useful bodies in the 
administrative state has reformed itself out of existence. 
Having corps of administrative judges dedicated to adjudication 
according to the policies of the executive branch may be an excellent 
mechanism for ensuring the furtherance of the goals of one of the 
political branches of government, the branch which chose those 
administrative judges with precisely that purpose in mind. Through 
their impartial decisionmaking, administrative judges are a unique 
and invaluable part of the executive process, and the Article III 
judiciary remains in place to halt any abuses of executive authority 
that administrative judges might inadvertently assist.210 To sever 
administrative judges from this role, therefore, is to destroy their 
particular genius; it is to transform the immensely useful executive 
judiciary into a largely redundant copy of the Article III courts. This 
does not, of course, condemn the proposal to create a central panel of 
209. Theoretically, at least. But the fact is that administrative judges, and 
even their non-protected counterparts in the federal system, often do not apply 
themselves to their duty of furthering the agency's policy choices. See Koch, 
supra note 94, at 282-84. This only reinforces the need to avoid exacerbating 
the situation further by giving administrative judges yet another reason to 
consider themselves unbound by agency policy. 
210. McNeil argues that, since administrative judges are bound to further 
executive policies and not to pass judgment on them (arguing that being the 
role of the judicial branch), administrative judges have "not been invested with 
judicial authority independent of the agency head, and as such, must follow the 
mandate of the agency head and construe the law consistent with the agency's 
interpretation of the law (even if ... the agency head was wrong in his or her 
construction of the law)." McNeil, supra note 85, at 515. Therefore, an 
administrative judge may be furthering some kind of injustice against his own 
inclination. However, the decision about whether that particular agency policy 
or interpretation of the law is contrary to justice belongs, in our system of 
government, to the judiciary; the administrative judge, being a member of the 
executive branch, is not competent to pass judgment on it, and is, therefore, 
bound to follow it. Professional ethics is about role, and the administrative 
judge must adhere to his role as an executive, not judicial, adjudicator; the 
judicial branch will do its job, and the executive, including the administrative 
judge, will do its. Those who worry about such adjudication furthering 
injustice, therefore, should remember that executive actions are subject to 
judicial review whether they are done directly by the President himself or 
indirectly through administrative judges following agency policies. 
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administrative judges; it only dictates care in its formation to secure 
the position of administrative judges as, essentially, servants of the 
agencies. Justice Scalia notes the possibility that "the unified corps 
would make a fundamental change in the perceived role of the 
administrative law judge as the 'front line' of the agency itself rather 
than an impartial outsider; and it is that issue which should 
probably control the fate of the proposal."211 Administrative judges 
are too important in their current role for them to abandon it and 
adopt another. Their lack of judicial-style independence is perhaps 
its own asset to fulfilling the administrative judiciary's proper role. 
Even in central panel states,212 much the same may be said. 
True, in such states, the judges will feel less a part of any particular 
agency and its internal hierarchy. But the central fact of review 
remains: central panel administrative judges' decisions are also 
reviewed directly by agencies, often case-party agencies. This is the 
key fact that largely deprives administrative judges of the judicial 
independence trait. 
In reality, nothing is fundamentally changed with the 
institution of the central panel concept. The administrative 
judiciary simply becomes a judiciary within the executive 
branch/administrative state. This feature may further serve to 
insulate the administrative judge in an impartiality sense, but the 
administrative judge remains a member of the executive branch, 
fully subject to override by the agency. 
Administrative judges are understandably zealous to protect 
their degree of independence, but in their zeal they often neglect 
their obvious dependence relative to the judicial branch. Indeed, 
sometimes they even claim to have more independence than Article 
III judges, or at least as much. Some administrative judges have 
claimed that "[t]he need for judicial independence in the 
administrative judiciary is just as pressing as the need for judicial 
independence in the judicial branch."213 Independence is the "gold 
standard" for a judiciary. Emerging judiciaries around the globe are 
aspiring to its promise to reform governing structures. It is natural 
211. Scalia, supra note 86, at 79. 
212. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1092.01 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-
40 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 9-1602 (LexisNexis 2004); TEX. GoV'T 
CODE ANN.§ 2003.021 (Vernon 2000); Yvette N. Diamond, OAR-What's It All 
About?, MD. B.J., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 4, 6 (describing Maryland's Office of 
Administrative Hearings as "a centralized panel of ALJs in a separate and 
independent agency under the executive branch of the Maryland state 
government"). See generally James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in 
Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401 (2005); 
Flanagan, supra note 2. 
213. Felter, supra note 83, at 22. 
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for administrative judges to claim it. But, "[t]o call for the ALJ to 
aspire to judicial independence ... offers real potential for the loss 
of public trust and confidence in the administrative adjudicative 
process"214 because the public would no longer be able to rely on 
administrative judge fidelity to agency goals and policies. 215 While 
this role of furthering agency policies may not be as glamorous as 
that of the Article III judiciary, it defines the essential quality of 
administrative judges' work that makes them indispensable to the 
administration of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no need for the defensiveness exhibited in a variety of 
administrative judge-written pieces on independence. The fact that 
administrative judges may not be meant to be independent in the 
judicial, especially Article III, sense, does not mean that 
administrative judges are not professionals, and are not playing a 
critical role in the delivery of justice and the application of law. 
Their role in delivering justice to individuals is critical. But critical 
roles can be played without independence. Administrative judges 
need not share every attribute with courts to be highly regarded. 
It is no criticism or slander to administrative judges to say that 
they are not meant to be independent in the judicial sense. 
Administrative judges are not meant to be checks on out-of-bounds 
exercises of legislative and executive power. They are, however, 
meant to deliver, impartially, a tremendous measure of front-line 
justice to individuals. In this regard, their work certainly exceeds 
that of Article III judges and perhaps that of state court judges as 
well. This is the distinction of administrative judges worth 
defending against the encroachments of claims of judicial 
independence. 
214. McNeil, supra note 85, at 514. 
215. McNeil provides a lengthy argument about the importance of ALJ 
fidelity to executive policies which would be compromised by granting them 
Article III-type independence. !d. at 512-14. That administrative judges are, at 
least to a certain degree, bound to promote agency policies does not seem open 
to question. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 139, at 592 (asserting that 
administrative judges are "a group of critical employees charged with 
implementing an agency's policy but nevertheless supposedly independent of 
the agency") (quoting O'Keeffe, supra note 2, at 594)). 
